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PREVIEW; Ramon v. Short: Local Authority in the Context of
Federal Immigration Detention Requests
Joseph D. Weaver*
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in
this matter on Wednesday, January 8, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom
of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building,
Helena, Montana. Alex Rate will likely appear on behalf of the Appellant.
Maureen H. Lennon will likely appear on behalf of the Appellee.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents two significant issues. The preliminary issue is
whether the mootness doctrine prevents review of the district court’s
refusal to enjoin the Lincoln County Sheriff from detaining an inmate
pursuant to a federal immigration detainer request.1 If the claim is not
moot, or if an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, the core issue is
whether Montana law authorizes the Sheriff to detain a person pursuant to
a federal immigration detainer request.2
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 3, 2018, Agustin Ramon was arrested on a burglary
charge and held in the Lincoln County Jail with a $25,000 bond.3 That
same day, United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued
an immigration detainer request for Ramon, requesting the jail detain
Ramon for up to 48 hours after he was entitled to release on the burglary
charge.4 The detainer request stated that a border patrol agent had probable
cause to believe Ramon was unlawfully present in the United States in
violation of civil immigration law.5
On August 17, 2018, a bondsman notified Lincoln County Jail that
he intended to post bond for Ramon.6 Jail officials notified the bondsman
that he was free to post bond, but Ramon would remain detained pursuant
*

Candidate for J.D. 2020, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Ramon v. Short (Mont. July 12, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661);
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief at 3, Ramon v. Short (Mont. Sept. 9, 2019) (No.
DA 18-0661).
2
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2; Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief,
supra note 1, at 7.
3
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
4
Id. at 3.
5
Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States in Support of Appellee Darren Short at 6, Ramon v.
Short (Mont. Sept. 3, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661).
6
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 1.
1
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to the detainer request even if the bond were paid.7 The bondsman did not
post bond for Ramon, and no other individual attempted to post bond.8
On October 30, 2018, Ramon filed a complaint in state district court
alleging that his continued detention violated Montana law.9 Ramon
applied for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
concurrently with his complaint.10 The district court denied his application
and held that Ramon was legally detained under Montana Code Annotated
§ 7-32-2203(3).11 Ramon remained in state custody until sentencing on
February 11, 2019, at which point he was released and transferred to the
custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).12
Ramon timely appealed the district court’s decision.13 The Sheriff
moved to dismiss the appeal as moot on the grounds that Ramon is no
longer in the state’s custody, and, therefore, injunctive relief is
impossible.14 The Montana Supreme Court denied the Sheriff’s motion to
dismiss. The Court then directed the parties to submit briefs on whether an
exception to the mootness doctrine applies and whether Montana law
authorizes state law enforcement to extend a person’s detention pursuant
to a federal detainer request.15
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Ramon argues the Court should hear the merits of the case because
two exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply.16 First, Ramon asserts the
“public interest exception” applies because the extent of Montana officers’
authority to make civil immigration arrests presents a question of
exceptional public importance, and resolution of the issue is necessary to
guide law enforcement in the performance of their duties.17 Second,
Ramon argues the issue is not moot because it is “capable of repetition yet
evading review.”18 On the merits, Ramon argues that holding a person
pursuant to an immigration detainer constitutes a new arrest, and the
Sheriff lacks authority to make civil immigration arrests.19
7

Id.
Id.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
10
Id.
11
Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7–32–2203(3) (2019) (“Who may be confined in a detention center.
Detention centers are used as follows: . . . for the confinement of persons committed for contempt or
upon civil process or by other authority of law . . . .”).
12
Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 6.
13
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
14
Id. at 6.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 6, 9 (citing Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group v.
Board of Cty Comm’rs, 260 P.3d 133, 137 (Mont. 2011)).
18
Id. at 6 (citing Gateway Opencut, 260 P.3d at 137).
19
Id. at 7–8.
8
9
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In response, the Sheriff argues that Ramon’s appeal is moot because
Ramon is no longer detained in the jail, and therefore Ramon is unable to
obtain injunctive relief.20 The Sheriff also asserts that no exception to the
mootness doctrine applies.21 If the Court reaches the merits of the claim,
the Sheriff argues that Montana law authorizes civil detention pursuant to
immigration detainer requests.22
A.

Appellant Ramon’s Argument

Ramon argues the Court should apply an exception to the mootness
doctrine and reach the merits of his claim because Montana law
enforcement needs guidance on whether it has the authority to make civil
immigration arrests.23 The extent of a sheriff’s power to deprive Montana
residents of liberty is a question of utmost importance.24 Without a ruling
on the merits, sheriffs will continue to detain individuals pursuant to CPB
detainer requests, undermining fundamental liberty interests.25 Ramon
argues this issue is certain to recur, as Montana counties received 135 CBP
detainer requests from 2017 through 2018.26 Furthermore, the issue will
continue to evade review because the requested 48-hour detention period
is “too short in duration” for an inmate to challenge the detention’s
legality, especially on appeal, before the inmate is released from state
custody and transferred to DHS.27
On the merits, Ramon’s argument is twofold. First, he contends the
Sheriff effectuated a new arrest by keeping Ramon in jail for a new
purpose after he was otherwise entitled to release.28 When jail officials told
the bondsman they would not release Ramon even if his bond were posted,
a “reasonable person would not have felt free to walk away under the
circumstances.”29 Furthermore, immigration detention constitutes arrest
because it results in “actual restraint of the person to be arrested.”30
Because it constitutes an arrest, the Sheriff needs authority under Montana
law to effectuate the arrest.31 Second, Ramon argues the Sheriff does not
have authority to effectuate an arrest pursuant to CBP detainers, and
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 2.
22
Id. at 7.
23
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9.
24
Id. at 9.
25
Id. at 10, 13.
26
Id. at 11 (citing Trans. Records Access Clearinghouse, Syr. Univ., Latest Data: ICE Detainers
(Dec. 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detain/).
27
Id. at 11, 12, 13–14 (citing Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group v. Board Of Cty Comm’rs,
260 P.3d 133, 137 (Mont. 2011)).
28
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 14.
29
Id. at 15 (citing State v. Ellington, 143 P.3d 119, 122 (Mont. 2006)).
30
Id. at 15; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-104 (2019).
31
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17–18 (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
305 (1958)).
20
21
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therefore, such a detention is unlawful.32 In particular, he argues the
district court erroneously relied on § 7–32–2203(3) in justifying the
Sheriff’s arrest because the statute does not confer arrest authority. Rather,
it describes who may be confined in jail after a valid arrest or sentence.33
B.

Appellee Sheriff Short’s Argument

The Sheriff’s principal argument is that Ramon’s appeal is moot.34
The Court is unable to grant injunctive relief from the Sheriff’s detention
because Ramon is no longer in the Sheriff’s custody.35 Therefore, the
appeal is moot because it no longer presents a justiciable controversy.36
The Sheriff argues the public interest exception does not apply because the
claim does not involve a question of exceptional public importance.37
Further, he contends the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception requires that the same complaining party will be subject to the
same practice again.38 Since Ramon has already been released from the
Sheriff’s custody and transferred to DHS, it is unlikely Ramon will be
subject to another immigration detainer, and therefore the exception does
not apply.39
If the claim is not moot, the Sheriff maintains that Ramon’s detention
was lawful because he did not effectuate a new arrest.40 Specifically, he
contends Ramon was never detained pursuant to the detainer request
because he was never “otherwise free to leave” the state’s custody.41
Rather, Ramon remained incarcerated pursuant to the state’s burglary
charges until sentencing, and then he was immediately released to DHS
custody.42 Ramon never posted bond and the state’s charges had not yet
been resolved.43 However, even if a new arrest occurred, the Sheriff argues
that Montana law authorizes detention pursuant to immigration detainers
because local jails may confine persons committed upon “civil process.”44
He argues immigration is a civil process under federal law, and, therefore,
the Sheriff has the authority to hold inmates pursuant to detainer
requests.45
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 14.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 14; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2203(3) (2019).
34
See generally Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
35
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 5.
38
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Zunski v.
Frenchtown Rural Fire Dep’t Bd. Of Trustees, 309 P.3d 21, 25–26 (Mont. 2013)).
39
Id. at 5–7.
40
Id. at 7.
41
Id. at 5, 7.
42
Id. at 7.
43
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 7.
44
Id. at 8–9; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-2203(3) (2019).
45
Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief, supra note 1, at 9.
32
33
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ANALYSIS
Mootness

The Court will likely apply an exception to the mootness doctrine and
reach the merits of the claim to clarify the extent of local law
enforcement’s authority to comply with federal immigration detainers. In
particular, the Court’s directive to the parties to brief the issue on the
merits indicates its desire to resolve the issue.46 The Court may determine
that the issue is of exceptional public importance because it implicates
detainees’ fundamental liberty interests.47 In the alternative, it may hold
the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review because immigration
detention will likely affect other inmates in the future, even if it no longer
affects Ramon.48 Either way, the Court will likely reach the merits of the
case.
B.

Immigration Detention

The threshold question on the merits is whether holding a person
pursuant to an immigration detainer request constitutes a new arrest. Under
Montana law, “an arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by the person’s submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest.”49 Arrest is accorded a broad definition in Montana and is
determined by whether a reasonable person would have felt free to walk
away under the circumstances.50 Ramon presents a strong argument as to
why his detention constituted an arrest.51 His bondsman was notified that
posting bond would be “futile” due to the immigration detainer,52 and the
Sheriff kept the jail door locked indicating Ramon was not free to leave.53

46

Order at 2, Ramon v. Bowe (Mont. May 28, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661). Roby Bowe was Sheriff of
Lincoln County at the time the initial complaint was filed. The current Sheriff of Lincoln County,
Darren Short, has been substituted for Roby Bowe. In its Order, the Court acknowledges it is unable
to enjoin the Sheriff but still directs the parties to “brief the merits of Ramon’s arguments . . . .”
47
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 10, 13.
48
See, e.g., Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003) (Court reached the merits of former
detainee’s challenge to certain jail practices even after detainee was released because other inmates
could be subjected to the same practices); Wier v. Lincoln Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 925 P.2d 1172
(Mont. 1996) (Court reached merits of inmate’s challenge to bail denial even though he had already
been released); Matter of N.B., 620 P.2d 1228 (Mont. 1980) (Court applied exception to mootness
without considering whether the plaintiff was likely to face the challenged policy again because
other Montanans were subject to the same policy).
49
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-104 (2019).
50
State v. Ellington, 143 P.3d 119, 122 (Mont. 2006).
51
See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15–17; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6-11,
Ramon v. Short (Mont. Sept. 23, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661).
52
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 51, at 6.
53
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 15.
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In general, however, the Court may interpret immigration detainers
not as new arrests, but as “temporary extension[s] of current custody.” 54
In other words, an immigration detainer merely assists CBP in effecting
its own arrest procedure; after the Sheriff’s brief extension of custody, the
inmate is transferred to CBP and CBP effects the new arrest under valid
procedures.55 Under either interpretation, the Court’s holding will clarify
whether extension of custody constitutes arrest, whether continued
detention constitutes arrest, and whether immigration detention constitutes
arrest.
The next crucial determination is whether the Sheriff has authority to
detain a person pursuant to CBP immigration detainers. On one hand, the
Court may hold that the district court erroneously relied on § 7-32-2203(3)
as granting the Sheriff authority to arrest. Even if the statute provided
authority to arrest on “civil process,” it still might not authorize detention
because immigration detainers do not constitute “process” under Montana
law.56 “Process means a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial
proceedings.”57 An immigration detainer is issued by DHS, not a judicial
officer, and, therefore, it is not issued in the course of judicial proceedings
and might not constitute a process under Montana law. 58 On the other
hand, the Court may frame the Sheriff’s authority in terms of cooperation
with a federal agency.59 The federal government retains power over the
subject of immigration and the status of aliens.60 Local law enforcement
may cooperate with DHS in the detention of aliens when that cooperation
is pursuant to a request from the federal government.61 If the Court chooses
this route, it will need to resolve state sovereignty and other preemption
issues.62
Both Ramon and the Sheriff are supported by persuasive policy
considerations. Amici Curiae in support of Ramon explain that DHS has
improperly issued immigration detainers to target and extradite the
immigrant population in recent years, regardless of whether that

See Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 4, 8. DHS’s detainer form requests
local law enforcement to “[m]aintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48
HOURS . . . beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your
custody.” Department of Homeland Security Form I-247A at 1, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (emphasis original).
55
Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 8.
56
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 27; Brief of Amicus Curiae Montana Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (MTACDL) at 5–6, Ramon v. Short (Mont. July 19, 2019) (No. DA 180661).
57
MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-202(5) (2019)
58
8 C.F.R.§ 287.7(b) (2019).
59
Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 1–5.
60
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012).
61
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2019).
62
Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 8–10; Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra
note 51, at 19–20.
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population poses a threat to public safety.63 For example, in Montana 54
percent of DHS immigration detainers were issued in 2012 against
immigrants with no criminal convictions.64 On the other hand, an
immigration detainer demonstrates that a CBP officer has probable cause
to believe an alien has violated federal immigration law and is legally
subject to extradition.65 By complying with detainer requests, a sheriff
cooperates with the federal government’s efforts to enforce civil
immigration law.66 Ultimately, however, when balancing the interests of
individual liberty with the interest of law and enforcement, the Court tends
to protect the individual liberty interests.
As such, it is anticipated that the Court will ultimately conclude that
holding a person pursuant to an immigration detainer request constitutes
an arrest, and the Sheriff does not have authority under Montana law to
effectuate the arrest. An immigration detainer asks the Sheriff to keep
someone in jail after they would otherwise be entitled to release. Such a
request clearly undermines a person’s liberty because they would be free
to leave jail but for CBP’s request for further detention. Considering
Montana’s broad definition of arrest, immigration detention probably
constitutes arrest. Furthermore, the district court likely erred in holding
that § 7-32-2203(3) provides the Sheriff with the necessary authority to
effectuate an immigration detention. That statute does not confer explicit
arrest authority, and the Court should interpret statutes carefully when
questions of individual liberty are at stake.
V.

CONCLUSION

This case concerns whether state law enforcement may extend an
individual’s arrest pursuant to a CBP detainer request. Before ruling on
the merits, the Court must find an exception to mootness. In doing so, the
Court would have an opportunity to clarify the extent of Montana law
enforcements’ authority regarding federal immigration detainers. The
Court’s holding will affect local law enforcement, detainees, and
immigrants residing in Montana.

Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause at 3–5, Ramon v. Short (July 12, 2019) (No. DA
18-0661).
64
Id. at 5 (citing Trans. Rec. Access Clearinghouse, Targeting of ICE Detainers Varies Widely by
State and by Facility Tbl. 2 (Feb. 11, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/343/).
65
8 C.F.R. § 287.7; 8 U.S.C. § 1182, 1227.
66
Brief of Amicus Curiae The United States, supra note 5, at 17–18.
63

